

# Random Self-Reducibility of Learning Problems over Burnside Groups

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*Joint work with Nelly Fazio, Kevin Iga, Antonio Nicolosi and Ludovic Perret*

- 1 Motivation & Background**
  - Why Group-Theoretic Cryptography?
  - Random self-reducibility
- 2 Learning Problems Over Burnside Groups**
  - Background: LWE
  - LHN Problem
  - Burnside Groups and  $B_n$ -LHN
- 3 The Reduction, in 3 Easy Steps**
  - Step 1: An Observation
  - Step 2: Completeness for Surjections
  - Step 3: Irrelevance of the Restriction

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# Motivation

- Interesting mathematical problem on its own . . .
- Tackling crypto challenges of post-quantum era [Sh'94]
  - Shor's algorithm: Efficient quantum procedure to compute the order of any element in a cyclic group
  - Hardness of order-finding at the heart of most popular public-key cryptosystems: RSA, Diffie-Hellman
  - If quantum computing becomes practical, we'll need new cryptographic primitives
- Quantum computing aside, **diversifying assumptions** still seems prudent

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# Prior Work in Non-Commutative Cryptography

Challenging computational problems abound in group theory, however...

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## Main Results

- In this work we demonstrate a **random self-reducibility** property for a new group-theoretic problem put forth in the work of Baumslag *et al.* [BFNSS11].
- In particular, we show a **worst-case to average-case** reduction for the  $B_n$ -LHN problem (more on that later...)

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- Random self-reducibility has been a hallmark of every successful cryptographic assumption to-date.
- This is not so surprising:
  - Any cryptosystem implementation must include an algorithm which samples  $n$  random instances of a computational problem.
  - If  $n$  problems that were instances are not difficult to find, a reduction between them exists.

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# The $B_n$ -LHN Problem

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- The problem is a generalization of LWE, moving from vector spaces and inner products to the setting of groups and homomorphisms.
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Let  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ . The picture is as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbb{F}_p^n & \ni & \mathbf{a} \\ \mathbf{s} \cdot \_ \downarrow & & \downarrow \approx \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{a} \\ \mathbb{F}_p & \ni & b = \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{a} + e \end{array}$$

## LWE, Informally

Roughly, the **Learning With Errors** problem is to recover  $\mathbf{s}$  by sampling preimage-image pairs in the presence of some small “noise”

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More precisely, let

- $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_\rho^n$
- $\Psi$  be a discrete gaussian distribution over  $\mathbb{F}_\rho$  centered at 0
- Define a distribution  $\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{s}, \Psi}$  on  $\mathbb{F}_\rho^n \times \mathbb{F}_\rho$  whose samples are pairs  $(\mathbf{a}, b)$  where  $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_\rho^n, b = \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{a} + e, e \leftarrow \Psi$

## Definition (LWE Search)

The Learning With Errors problem is to recover  $\mathbf{s}$  by sampling the distribution  $\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{s}, \Psi}$ .

## Definition (LWE Decision)

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# Learning Homomorphisms With Errors

## Observation

LWE's formulation was mainly algebraic:

- Expressed in terms of homomorphisms
- Complexity reductions (worst case to average case, search to decision) also algebraic

This motivates the following

question:

Can simple learning problems yield simple (non-algebraic) complexity reductions to more complex ones?

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Can we do better than the best known algorithms for learning with errors?  
What are the barriers?

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
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
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## Vector Spaces



## Groups



# Learning Homomorphisms from Images with Errors

## Setup

- Let  $G_n$  and  $P_n$  be groups
- Set  $\Gamma_n, \Psi_n$ , distributions on  $G_n, P_n$ , resp.
- Let  $\Phi_n$  be a distribution on the set of all homomorphisms,  $\text{hom}(G_n, P_n)$

## The Distribution $A_{\varphi, \psi_n}$

For  $\varphi \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \Phi_n$ , define the analogous distribution  $A_{\varphi, \psi_n}$  on  $G_n \times P_n$  whose samples are  $(a, b)$  where

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# Learning Homomorphisms from Images with Errors

## Search Problem

Given  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi, \psi_n}$ , recover  $\varphi$ .

## Decision Problem

Given samples from an unknown distribution  
 $\mathbf{R} \in \{\mathbf{A}_{\varphi, \psi_n}, \mathbf{U}(G_n \times P_n)\}$ , determine  $\mathbf{R}$ .

## Hardness Assumption (Decision Version)

$$\mathbf{A}_{\varphi, \psi_n} \underset{\text{PPT}}{\approx} \mathbf{U}(G_n \times P_n)$$

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# Instantiation: Free Burnside Groups

## Question

For which groups (if any) does the abstract problem make sense?

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- We'll review some of the intuition for this choice, as well as some of the key facts about these groups below.

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# Varieties of Groups

The free Burnside groups can be thought of as living in a certain variety of groups.

## Variety of Groups (Informal)

Roughly speaking, a **variety** is the class of all groups whose elements satisfy a certain set of equations.

## Example

Abelian groups can be seen as the variety corresponding to the equation

$$XY = YX.$$

The Burnside groups live in the variety defined by the equation  $X^m = 1$ .

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
Abelian groups can be seen as the variety corresponding to the equation

$$XY = YX.$$


The Burnside groups live in the variety defined by the equation  $X^m = 1$ .

# Varieties of Groups

Via the usual “abstract nonsense”, it is easy to see that varieties of groups contain free objects—just take a free group and factor out the normal subgroup resulting from all the “equations”...




Sets




Groups

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Sets



Groups

# Varieties of Groups

## Question

Which varieties of groups contain **finite free objects**???

If the equations are say,

$$\begin{aligned}[X, Y] &= 1 \\ X^p &= 1\end{aligned}$$

then the free objects are exactly  $\mathbb{Z}_p^n$ , which are the objects of study in  
LWE (if  $p$  is prime).

## Question

What happens if the  $[X, Y] = 1$  equation is removed? In general, the  
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# Burnside Groups

## Notation

For the variety of groups defined by the equation  $X^m = 1$ , denote the free group on  $n$  generators in this variety by  $B(n, m)$ .

Determining the finiteness of  $B(n, m)$  is known as the **Bounded Burnside Problem**.

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Determining the finiteness of  $B(n, m)$  is known as the **Bounded Burnside Problem**.

# Bounded Burnside Problem

For  $n > 1$  and for sufficiently large  $m$ , it is known that  $|B(n, m)| = \infty$ , yet for small  $m$ , our understanding is far from complete:

$B(n, 2)$	Finite (also abelian)
$B(n, 3)$	Finite
$B(n, 4)$	Finite
$B(n, 5)$	Unknown
$B(n, 6)$	Finite
$B(n, 7)$	Unknown
$\vdots$	$\vdots$

- The authors of [BFNSS11] chose to use  $B(n, 3)$  to instantiate the abstract LHN problem.
  - It's finite
  - It's the smallest non-abelian case
  - The structure of  $B(3, n)$  is fairly well understood
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## The $B_n$ -LHN Problem

This is simply the LHN problem, instantiated with free Burnside groups.

- The homomorphisms are sampled uniformly from  $\text{hom}(B_n, B_r)$ .
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  - Step 3: Irrelevance of the Restriction

We can break the argument into 3 easy steps:

- 1 Start with a simple observation for a partial randomization.
- 2 Show this randomization is complete for a restricted version of the problem.
- 3 Show that the restricted version is statistically equivalent to the original problem.

Hence the reduction applies to the original problem as well as the restricted version. The original problem would solve the original problem procedurally by applying the reduction to the restricted version of the problem.

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# An Observation

## Lemma

Let  $(a, b = \varphi(a) \cdot e) \in G_n \times P_n$  be an instance of LHN sampled according to  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\Psi_n}$ , and  $\alpha$  be a permutation of  $G_n$ . It holds that  $(a', b) = (\alpha(a), b) \in G_n \times P_n$  is sampled according to  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi \circ \alpha^{-1}}^{\Psi_n}$ .

## Proof.

Observe that

$$\begin{aligned} (a' = \alpha(a), b) &= (\alpha(a), \varphi(a) \cdot e) \\ &= (\alpha(a), \varphi \circ \alpha^{-1}(\alpha(a)) \cdot e) \\ &= (a', \varphi \circ \alpha^{-1}(a') \cdot e). \end{aligned}$$

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# Completeness of the Randomization

## Observation

Right-composition by an automorphism will not change the image of  $\varphi$ .

- Okay, so the technique from the lemma will not suffice to randomize all instances, but what about **surjective homomorphisms???**
- The following would be ideal:

## Lemma

*The action of  $\text{Aut}(B_n)$  on  $\text{Epi}(B_n, B_r)$  is transitive.*

- This is true, but requires some work...
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# Proving Transitivity

Consider the following commutative diagram, where  $\rho$  is the projection on to the commutator factor, taking  $B_n \longrightarrow B_n/[B_n, B_n] \cong (\mathbb{F}_3^n, +)$ :

$$\begin{array}{ccc} B_n & \xrightarrow{\rho} & \mathbb{F}_3^n \\ \varphi \downarrow & & \downarrow \overline{\varphi} \\ B_r & \xrightarrow{\rho} & \mathbb{F}_3^r \end{array}$$

The main technical lemma used to prove transitivity is the following:

*Lemma*

*Surjections from  $B_n \longrightarrow B_r$  are precisely the maps whose abelianization is also surjective.*

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# Proving the Lemma

- The proof is somewhat involved, and makes use of some specific details of the structure of free Burnside groups.
- However, some of the details can be abstracted away by a few invocations of the **Five Lemma**.

# The Five Lemma

Consider the following commutative diagram, where the rows are exact.

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccc} A & \longrightarrow & B & \longrightarrow & C & \longrightarrow & D & \longrightarrow & E \\ \downarrow e & & \downarrow f & & \downarrow g & & \downarrow h & & \downarrow i \\ A' & \longrightarrow & B' & \longrightarrow & C' & \longrightarrow & D' & \longrightarrow & E' \end{array}$$

## Lemma (Five Lemma)

*The **five lemma** states that if  $e$  is surjective and  $i$  is injective, then if  $f$  and  $h$  are isomorphisms, so is  $g$ . Furthermore, if  $i$  is injective and  $f$  and  $h$  are surjective, then  $g$  is also surjective.<sup>a</sup>*

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# Proving the Lemma

We'll apply the lemma to the following diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccc} 0 & \longrightarrow & [B_n, B_n] & \xrightarrow{i} & B_n & \xrightarrow{\rho} & \mathbb{F}_3^n & \longrightarrow & 0 \\ & & \downarrow \hat{\varphi} & & \downarrow \varphi & & \downarrow \bar{\varphi} & & \\ 0 & \longrightarrow & [B_r, B_r] & \xrightarrow{i} & B_r & \xrightarrow{\rho} & \mathbb{F}_3^r & \longrightarrow & 0 \end{array} \quad (1)$$

- By the Five Lemma, proving  $\hat{\varphi}$  is onto would suffice to prove our lemma, since then  $\varphi$  would be onto as well.
- Intuitively, dealing with the restriction to  $[B_n, B_n]$  should be easier than the original map  $\varphi$ .<sup>1</sup>

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# Now Back to Transitivity...

We proceed in a straightforward manner:

## Goal

Given an arbitrary epimorphism  $\varphi$  and a target epimorphism  $\varphi^*$  we want to find an automorphism  $\alpha$  such that

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
We'd like to find an automorphism  $\alpha$  so that the following diagram commutes:

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 & & B_n & \xrightarrow{\varphi^*} & B_r & & \\
 & & \downarrow \rho & \searrow \alpha & \downarrow \rho & \searrow 1_{B_r} & \\
 0 & \longrightarrow & K & \xrightarrow{\quad} & B_n & \xrightarrow{\varphi} & B_r \longrightarrow 0 \\
 & & \downarrow \rho & & \downarrow \rho & & \downarrow \rho \\
 & & \mathbb{F}_3^n & \xrightarrow{\quad} & \mathbb{F}_3^r & & \\
 & & \downarrow \bar{\alpha} & \searrow & \downarrow \bar{\varphi} & \searrow 1_{\mathbb{F}_3^r} & \\
 0 & \longrightarrow & \bar{K} & \xrightarrow{\quad} & \mathbb{F}_3^n & \xrightarrow{\bar{\varphi}} & \mathbb{F}_3^r \longrightarrow 0
 \end{array} \tag{2}$$

# The Idea

## Idea

- The idea is simple—after all,  $B_n$  is free!
- This allows us to define  $\alpha$  to explicitly send basis elements where they need to go to make the composition work.



# Proving Transitivity

- From the fact that  $B_n$  is free, we know that such an  $\alpha$  exists.
- With the help of the previous lemma, we can show there is always a way to choose  $\alpha$  to be bijective. ■

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# One More Lemma...

All that remains to show RSR for our restricted problem is to show the following

## Lemma

*Let  $G$  be a finite group, and  $S$  a set on which  $G$  acts transitively. Let  $s \in S$  be an arbitrary element, and consider the distribution  $A_s$  on  $S$  whose samples are  $g \cdot s$  where  $g \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(G)$ . Then  $A_s = \mathbf{U}(S)$ .*

## Proof.

A simple counting argument (say, using the orbit-stabilizer theorem) suffices to show that each element  $t \in S$  has the same number of preimages under the map from  $G \longrightarrow S$  defined by  $g \mapsto g \cdot s$ . ■



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# How Many Surjective Maps?

- Most homomorphisms  $\varphi : B_n \longrightarrow B_r$  are surjective.
- In fact, if there is just a superlogarithmic gap between  $r$  and  $n$  then non-surjective maps comprise only a negligible fraction of the set of all homomorphisms.
- Even a crude estimate gives a  $3^{r-n}$  fraction of all homomorphisms being non-surjective.

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- In fact, if there is just a superlogarithmic gap between  $r$  and  $n$  then non-surjective maps comprise only a negligible fraction of the set of all homomorphisms.
- Even a crude estimate gives a  $3^{r-n}$  fraction of all homomorphisms being non-surjective.

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As a result, the altered distribution of instances (coming from sampling uniform surjective maps) is statistically close to the uniform distribution  $\mathbf{U}(\text{hom}(B_n, B_r))$ . In general,

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For any  $X_n \subset S_n$ ,

$$\Delta(\mathbf{U}(X_n), \mathbf{U}(S_n)) = \frac{|S_n \setminus X_n|}{|S_n|}$$

Hence, whenever  $\nu(n) = |S_n \setminus X_n| / |S_n|$  is negligible in  $n$  (as in our case), then the ensemble of distributions  $\mathbf{U}(X_n)$  is statistically close to  $\mathbf{U}(S_n)$ .

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# Irrelevance of the Restriction

- The modified problem is no different than the original from a computational perspective
- Any efficient algorithm breaking the modified scheme could be used to break the original scheme (and vice versa).
- This proves the random self reducibility of the  $B_n$ -LHN problem.

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